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PLEADING “INNOCENT”?: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
 
Pamela R. Ferguson* 
 
Wrongful convictions are difficult to overturn due to the pressure for finality in criminal trials. 
They appear to be more common in the United States than in Scotland. They have a variety of 
causes, but much of the dissatisfaction in the United States has focused on the adversarial nature 
of the criminal process. This has led to proposals for alternative procedures for those who do not 
simply rely upon the presumption of innocence and the standard of proof, and plead “not guilty”, 
but positively assert that they are in fact “innocent”. The reform proposals include enhanced pre-
trial processes, more active judicial involvement in the trial, and removal of the right of silence, 
much of which reflects a more inquisitorial approach, similar to that employed in many 
continental European jurisdictions. This article briefly considers the nature of “innocence” in a 
criminal context. It then reviews a number of the “actual innocence” reform proposals, and 
compares key features of criminal procedure in the United States with those which operate in 
Scotland – a jurisdiction which has not, to date, experienced an “innocence crisis”. The article 
concludes that various features of Scottish criminal procedure render “actual innocence” devices 
unnecessary and tend to explain why wrongful convictions appear to be rarer in Scotland than in 
the United States. 
 
Wrongful Convictions and Innocence 
 
 Extent and Causes of Wrongful Convictions 
 
 The “innocence movement” has become a global phenomenon, with Innocence 
Organizations now operating in several countries.1 In the United States alone, more than 2,000 
convicted people have had their convictions quashed based on new evidence of innocence, 
largely from the advent of DNA evidence.2 When the number of exonerations in the United 
States reached 1,500, it was calculated that these defendants had between them spent more than 
13,000 years in prison.3 An analysis of the first 200 exoneration cases found that they often 
involved crimes of violence: 71% of them were rape convictions, 6% were murder convictions, 
and in 22% of the cases defendants had been convicted of both rape and murder.4 Biological 
materials such as blood or semen had been left by the perpetrators of these crimes; DNA 
identification demonstrated, albeit belatedly, that those who had been convicted were not in fact 
the perpetrators. For many crimes there was no biological evidence or none was collected by the 
police, so the true rate of wrongful convictions is likely to be higher than the number of reported 
                                                          
* Professor of Scots Law, University of Dundee. 
1 See the Innocence Network list, available at: http://innocencenetwork.org/members/#alpha (all URLs last accessed 
on 30 June 2017). 
2 The National Registry of Exonerations is available at http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/. For a 
description of wrongful conviction cases in the United States, see S. R. Gross, et al., “Exonerations in the United 
States 1989 through 2003”, Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, XCV (2005), p. 523; B. L. Garrett, “Judging 
Innocence”, Columbia Law Review, CVIII (2008), p. 55. 
3 L. Weathered, “Reflections on the Role of Innocence Organisations in Australia”, Flinders Law Journal, XVII 
(2015), pp. 515-516. 
4 Garrett, note 2 above, p. 73.  
  
exonerations might suggest.5 Other countries have similarly recognized that there have been 
more wrongful convictions than had been imagined hitherto,6 leading to the claim that this has 
become “an international human rights issue”.7 The problem seems particularly acute in the 
United States, however, where it has been suggested that innocent people are convicted of 
serious crimes “on a regular basis.”8 
Innocence scholarship has identified several potential sources of wrongful convictions, 
focusing primarily on certain types of potentially problematic evidence. These include: mistaken 
eyewitness identifications,9 flawed forensic science,10 perjured testimony (particularly from 
informers/“jailhouse snitches”11), false or fabricated confessions,12 and so-called “noble-cause 
corruption” by police – a willingness to fabricate evidence to ensure the conviction of a person 
whom they are convinced is the perpetrator.13 Other sources identified in the literature are 
inadequate performance by defense lawyers,14 and prosecutorial misconduct.15 In some cases of 
wrongful conviction a defendant is claiming that the criminal process was flawed, thus justice 
was not done. Others make the more profound claim that they did not, in fact, commit the crime, 
and it is on these types of cases which innocence projects primarily focus. One author has coined 
the term “innocentrism” to describe the growing concern to make protection of those who are 
actually innocent the central focus of the American justice system,16 and has suggested that “the 
effort to free the innocent has become the civil rights movement of the twenty-first century”.17 
Thus before embarking on discussion of reform proposals, some consideration must be given to 
what we mean by “innocence” and “guilt”. 
 
 “Legal” and “Factual” Innocence 
                                                          
5 See National Registry of Exonerations, note 2 above, which estimates that 24 % of exonerations are based on DNA 
evidence. 
6 See, for example, Public Prosecution Service of Canada, The Path to Justice: Preventing Wrongful Convictions 
(2011), available at: http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/ptj-spj/index.html; R. Dioso-Villa, “A Repository of 
Wrongful Convictions in Australia: First Steps towards Estimating Prevalence and Causal Contributing Factors”, 
Flinders Law Journal, XVII (2015), p. 163; J. He, “Case Study on the Causes of Wrongful Conviction in Chinese 
Criminal Proceedings”, Frontiers of Law in China, X (2015), p. 670.  
7 L. Weathered, “The Growing Acknowledgement of Wrongful Conviction - the Australian Response within an 
International Context”, Victoria University Law and Justice Journal, III (2013), p. 79.  
8 S. R. Gross, “Convicting the Innocent”, Annual Review of Law & Social Science, IV (2008), p. 174.    
9 See G. L. Wells, “Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Systemic Reforms”, Wisconsin Law Review (2006), p. 615; 
K. A. Findley, “Implementing the Lessons from Wrongful Convictions: An Empirical Analysis of Eyewitness 
Identification Reform Strategies”, Missouri Law Review, LXXXI (2016), p. 377.  
10 See K. Berger, “Science Convicting the Innocent”, Medicine and Law, XXIX (2010), p. 1. 
11 A. Natapoff, “Beyond Unreliable: How Jailhouse Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions”, Golden Gate 
University Law Review, XXXVII (2006), p. 107; J. A. Roth, “Informant Witnesses and the Risk of Wrongful 
Conviction”, American Criminal Law Review, LIII (2016), p. 737.  
12 B. Cutler, K. A. Findley and D. Loney, “Expert Testimony on Interrogation and False Confession”, University of 
Missouri at Kansas City Law Review, LXXXII (2014), pp. 591-595.  
13 See T. Newburn, Literature Review - Police Integrity and Corruption (2015), p. 9.   
14  S. M. Berry, “Bad Lawyering - How Defense Attorneys Help Convict the Innocent”, Northern Kentucky Law 
Review, XXX (2003), p. 487; J. A. C. Parker, “What a Poor Defense! Exploring the Ineffectiveness of Counsel for 
the Poor and Searching for a Solution”, Jones Law Review, VII (2003), p. 63. 
15 Gross, note 8 above, p. 186. See also H. M. Caldwell, “The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a 
Modest Proposal”, Catholic University Law Review, LXIII (2013), p. 51.  
16 D. S. Medwed, “Innocentrism”, University of Illinois Law Review (2008), p. 1549. 
17 Ibid., p. 1550. For a similar crisis of confidence in South Africa, see J. R. Du Plessis, “The Accusatorial System: 
Too Much a Game?”, South African Law Journal, CVIII (1991), p. 577. 
  
The difference between “legal innocence” and “factual innocence”, and between their 
counterparts “legal guilt” and “factual guilt”, is well-known to scholars of criminal procedure 
and evidence law.18 “Factual guilt” is generally taken to mean that the defendant did actually 
perform the criminal act (the actus reus) with the requisite mental element (the mens rea), while 
“legal guilt” means that the prosecution is able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt and in 
conformity with due process that the defendant performed the criminal act, etc. Likewise, those 
who did not commit the crime may be described as being “factually innocent”, while those 
whose are factually guilty but whose guilt cannot be, or has not been, established at trial are 
“legally innocent”. Michael and Lesley Risinger employ the terms “factual innocence” and 
“normative innocence”, and define “factual innocence” as occurring  
only when the defendant is innocent of the crime charged either because he was not the 
actual perpetrator (and bore no accomplice responsibility) or because no crime was 
committed. All other circumstances that might result in an acquittal or diminution in the 
charge to a lesser offense do not present circumstances of factual innocence, but of 
normative innocence connected with value judgements usually concerning attributed 
states of mind.19 
The reference to cases in which “no crime was committed” presumably refers to lack of an actus 
reus.20 By contrast, we can consider the position of a defendant, charged with murder for having 
caused the victim’s death in an unprovoked attack, but who claims that he did not intend to kill, 
merely to wound. He is not “factually innocent” since a non-intentional killing following assault 
is itself a crime (for example, “culpable homicide” in Scotland). It is not clear, however, whether 
the Risingers’ defendant who has killed in self-defense can claim “factual innocence”. It is not a 
crime to kill in self-defense, so perhaps “actual innocence” is an appropriate plea. However, it 
could equally be argued that the killer is merely “normatively innocent” since the actus reus of 
murder has been performed and a determination of self-defense is, at least in part, a normative 
decision for the jury.21 The latter interpretation seems the more plausible, since in an earlier 
paper Michael Risinger refers to “‘who, what, when, and where’ actus reus/identity fact issues” 
as “specific brute fact details of the crime and the identity of the defendant as its perpetrator.”22 
He elsewhere explains that “brute fact innocence” means “the defendant was not the perpetrator 
of the crime, and someone else was”.23  
In practice, distinguishing between “brute” facts and other facts is not always easy, nor is 
the distinction between law and fact always clear cut. Zuckerman uses the term “assumption of 
objectivity” to refer to the idea that “the facts of the individual case are not themselves created 
                                                          
18 “Factual innocence”/ “factual guilt” and “legal innocence”/ “legal guilt” are the terms favored in H. L. Packer, 
“Two Models of the Criminal Process”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, CXIII (1964), p. 1, at p. 17. See 
also H. L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968), pp. 166-167. 
19 D. M. Risinger and L. C. Risinger, “Innocence is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in Reforming 
Criminal Procedure”, New York Law School Law Review, LVI (2011-12), p. 869, at p. 875. 
20 See also M. Raymond, “The Problem with Innocence”, Cleveland State Law Review, XLIX (2001), p.  449, at p. 
456.  
21 Arguably a finding of self-defense has both a factual and a normative element. In terms of Scottish law: was 
reasonable force used by the defendant? Did the defendant believe on reasonable grounds that he was being 
threatened with deadly violence? The first is a question of fact, the second a normative question. 
22 D. M. Risinger, “Preliminary Thoughts on a Functional Taxonomy of Expertise for the Post-Khumho World” , 
Seton Hall Law Review, XXXI (2000), p. 508, at p. 528. 
23 D. M. Risinger, “Unsafe Verdicts: the Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and Review of Factual 
Innocence Claims”, Houston Law Review, XLI (2004-5), p. 1281, at p. 1298. 
  
by the law, but exist in the world that lies beyond the law.”24 This assumes that the trial will be 
able to ascertain some sort of objective truth,25 but what we treat as “the truth” is determined in 
part by certain values and principles which relate to our understanding of rights and duties, and 
this shapes the nature of the truth that emerges from the criminal process.26 Determining “the 
truth” in a criminal trial may well be an impossible task, and it is arguable that this is not the aim 
of an adversarial trial. Rather, its aim is the more attainable one of deciding whether we are sure 
enough of guilt to justify condemnation and punishment. An acquittal may follow because the 
jury (i) believes the defendant did in fact commit the crime, but that the case has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt; (ii) is not able to determine one way or another whether the 
defendant committed the crime; or (iii) believes the defendant had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the crime. It is only in the last of these scenarios that we can say that the jury believes that the 
defendant is in fact innocent, but in all three cases the verdict will be one of “not guilty” and the 
jury’s beliefs are immaterial. In short, an acquittal is not synonymous with a finding of 
“innocence”, rather it means that the prosecution has failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. It must be acknowledged, therefore, that not only is the separation of the “factually 
innocent” from the merely “legally innocent” theoretically difficult, it is also not something 
which the criminal process attempts to determine. This must be borne in mind when assessing 
claims that one or other system of criminal procedure is better at finding “the truth”. 
Subject to these caveats, this article uses the terms “factual innocence”/”actual 
innocence” in Risinger’s “brute fact innocence” sense, and uses “wrongful convictions” to refer to 
cases in which factually innocent defendants have been found legally guilty. This is a narrower 
definition of wrongful convictions than that used by some authors.27 It should not, however, be 
taken to suggest a lack of sympathy for the factually guilty person who has been convicted 
following a flawed criminal process. Such people are also victims of miscarriages of justice: their 
conviction threatens the moral integrity of the criminal justice system since even the factually 
guilty deserve a fair trial. However, the focus here is on wrongful convictions involving brute fact 
innocence – the “unjust treatment of the blameless”28 – since these are the cases which worry us 
the most.  
 
Reform Proposals 
 
There is a tendency to caricature both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, obscuring the 
fact that there has been a great deal of borrowing between them over the years.29 There is also a 
long history of American scholars, as well as some members of the US judiciary, denigrating 
European continental criminal procedures.30 It has even been suggested that for the US Supreme 
Court, “avoiding inquisitorial justice is what our own system is all about”,31 and that it treats 
continental criminal procedure as a “kind of negative polestar for American criminal 
                                                          
24 A. A. S. Zuckerman, “Law, Fact or Justice?”, Boston University Law Review, LXVI (1986), p. 487, at p. 487. 
25 Ibid., p. 488. 
26 Ibid., p. 489. 
27 For example, A. D. Leipold, “How the Pre-Trial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions”, American 
Criminal Law Review, XLII, (2005), p. 1123, at p. 1124. 
28 S. A. Bandes, “Framing Wrongful Convictions”, Utah Law Review, I (2008), p. 5, at p. 9.  
29 For the general argument see J. Jackson and S. Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence (2012), 
pp. 8-9. 
30 D. A. Sklansky, “Anti-Inquisitorialism”, Harvard Law Review, CXXII (2009), p. 1634.   
31 Ibid., p. 1638. 
  
procedure.”32 Those who favor adversarial systems have tended to subscribe to the view that they 
are likely to produce more accurate verdicts than their continental counterparts,33 but misgivings 
about the adversarial process surface periodically34 and, as noted previously, more recent debate 
has been sparked by DNA exonerations. Some scholars now suggest that the American justice 
system is incapable of reaching correct verdicts in cases involving “actual innocence”, leading to 
claims that “in its Americanized form, the process of allowing the parties to control examination 
of witnesses is a highly flawed mechanism for promoting accuracy”;35 “a search for truth is the 
most effective means through which to discover innocence.  Unfortunately, however, this 
premise does not currently underlie the adversarial system…”;36 and “the adversarial system in 
[the US] is too dysfunctional to reliably produce the truth”.37 Systems of criminal procedure can 
be judged on the extent to which they achieve correct verdicts and instill public confidence: these 
quotations illustrate a perception that the US criminal process is achieving neither goal, and is 
facing an “innocence crisis”.38 This has generated quite radical proposals, and we turn now to 
those offered by six of the leading scholars in this debate: Michael and Lesley Risinger, 
Christopher Slobogin, Tim Bakken, Samuel Gross, and Keith Findley.  
The Risingers suggest some practical ways to improve the collection of evidence by the 
police, such as that police vehicles should be fitted with cameras that activate to record whenever 
someone is in the back seat.39 Cameras could also capture any activity at police stations, not just 
in the interview rooms, but in the corridors and public areas.40 A recent empirical study in 
California found that incidents involving use of force by the police when wearing body-worn 
cameras (BWCs) was half the number recorded when cameras were not worn.41 Not only do 
cameras offer greater protection to suspects, they can also decrease accusations of police 
fabrication of confessions, and allegations that confessions were not voluntary.42 The Risingers 
also advocate improvement of pre-trial eyewitness identification procedures,43 and for police 
officers to be trained to conduct their investigations in a way which considers both the possibility 
that the suspect is guilty, and that he may be innocent.44 The pre-trial stage should be overseen 
                                                          
32 Ibid. 
33 As the US Supreme Court has put it: “Truth is best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of a 
question.” (United States v Cronic 466 US 648, 655 (1984)).   
34 See J. Frank, Courts on Trial: Myth and Reality in American Justice (1949), p. 20; M.  E. Frankel, “Search for 
Truth: An Umpireal View”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, CXXIII (1974-75), p. 1031. 
35 C. Slobogin, “Lessons from Inquisitorialism”, Southern California Law Review, LXXXVII (2014), p. 699, at p. 
704. 
36 T. Bakken, “Truth and Innocence Procedures to Free Innocent Persons: Beyond the Adversarial System”, 
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, XLI (2008), p. 547, at pp. 547-548 (footnote omitted). 
37 G. Kowaluk, “Legal Thinking, the Adversarial Process snd Exonerating Innocent Defendants: A Socio-Legal 
View of the Wrongful Conviction Process”, Southwestern Law Review, LXV (2015), p. 27, at p. 44. 
38 M. Zalman and J. Carrano, “Sustainability of Innocence Reform”, Albany Law Review, LXXVII (2013-14), p. 
955, at p. 958. 
39 Risinger and Risinger, note 19 above, p. 897. 
40 Ibid. 
41 B. Ariel, W. A. Farrar and A. Sutherland, “The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of Force and 
Citizens’ Complaints against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial”, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 
XXXI (2015), p. 509, pp. 523-524. See also D. Evans, “Police Body Cameras: Mending Fences and How Pittsburgh 
is a Leading Example”, Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law and Policy, XVI (2015), p. 76. 
42 Risinger and Risinger, note 19 above, p. 897. 
43 Ibid., pp. 898-906.  
44 Ibid., p. 891. 
  
by a “judicial officer” with a responsibility to ascertain the truth.45 Once this judicial officer has 
made the decision about which criminal charges to bring, all information collected by the police 
should be made available to both the prosecution and the defense.46  
More radically, the Risingers propose that defendants ought to be able to choose an 
alternative prosecution procedure: “the factual innocence track”.47 Anyone opting for this 
process would be required to specify in advance of the trial one or two facts which support their 
claim of innocence.48 Presumably this means that defendants would have to state at the outset 
that, for example, they have an alibi and have been incorrectly identified as the perpetrator, or 
that they acted in self-defense, or were coerced into committing the crime. Under this special 
procedure, defendants would have to testify at trial, thus waiving the Constitutional right to 
silence/privilege against self-incrimination.49 In return, the defense would be entitled to full pre-
trial disclosure of the prosecution evidence – something which currently does not happen as a 
matter of routine in the US.50 The Risingers argue that lack of pre-trial disclosure is a potent 
source of wrongful convictions of the factually innocent: while the factually guilty generally will 
have a fairly good idea of what they are being accused, and what the evidence against them is 
likely to show, the factually innocent may have little or no information about the circumstances 
of the charge.51 This disclosure by the prosecution would be dependent on the defense waiving a 
further Constitutional right: the right not to disclose its case, pre-trial.52  
Slobogin’s approach is similar to that of the Risingers in recommending an enhanced pre-
trial role for the judiciary. He wants trial judges to take on the job of selecting witnesses to 
testify at trial, and leading the questioning of witnesses.53 It should also be for the court rather 
than the parties to appoint expert witnesses.54 Again, defendants suffer a diminution of rights in 
return: they must give unsworn testimony at trial.55 The Risingers’ option of pleading 
“innocent”, rather than “not guilty”, is also favored by Bakken.56 Lest factually guilty people be 
tempted to opt for this plea, they need to be able to persuade their lawyer of their innocence for 
the lawyer must file an affidavit, asserting belief in the claim of innocence.57 It is not clear what 
this would achieve, given that many factually guilty people presumably protest their innocence 
even to their lawyers.58 Under Bakken’s system, counsel who filed an affidavit without a proper 
factual or legal basis could be sanctioned by the court.59 It has been suggested that many lawyers 
employ a “selective ignorance” model of client interviewing, during which they refrain from 
                                                          
45 Ibid., pp. 882-883: “We … will be calling for the institution of the supervising magistrate”. See also p. 894. 
46 Ibid., pp. 892-893. 
47 Ibid., p. 893. 
48 Ibid., p. 894. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., p. 875. This is discussed further, below. 
51 Ibid., p. 886.  
52 Ibid., p. 887.  
53 Slobogin, note 35 above, pp. 715-716.  
54 Ibid., p. 724. 
55 Ibid., p. 728. 
56 Bakken, note 36 above, pp. 549 and 566.  See also T. Bakken and L. M. Steel, “Exonerating the Innocent: Pretrial 
Innocence Procedures”, New York Law School Law Review, LVI (2011-12), p. 825. 
57 Ibid., p. 568.  
58 See Raymond, note 20 above, p. 460. 
59 Bakken, note 36 above, pp. 568-569.  
  
asking their clients whether or not they committed the crime.60 For Bakken’s model to work, this 
would have to change.  
Bakken’s “innocence” plea would trigger a pre-trial investigation by the prosecution, akin 
to those used in non-adversarial systems.61 Juries would be invited to draw favorable inferences 
of innocence if they found that the state had failed to conduct full investigations in these types of 
cases.62 He also advocates a higher standard of proof: rather than the jury being satisfied of guilt 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”, it would require to reach the standard of “moral certainty” or 
“beyond all reasonable doubt”.63 It is difficult to know what certainty beyond all reasonable 
doubt means – perhaps an unreasonable doubt, such that something highly improbable or bizarre 
may in fact have occurred – would be enough to bar conviction? In return, the defendant must 
co-operate with the investigation, submit to questioning, and waive the right to confidentiality 
regarding communications with counsel.64 These are radical proposals, particularly since they 
affect the confidentiality of lawyer/client communications, as well as the right to silence during 
police questioning and at trial. 
That those who claim innocence must waive their right to silence is also required under 
the scheme devised by Gross;65 such defendants must answer questions from state officials at the 
investigation stage (with counsel present, and “possibly under oath”), and must also testify at 
trial.66 Gross acknowledges that requiring defendants to testify on oath would breach the Fifth 
Amendment to the US Constitution,67 but argues that the quid pro quo for benefitting from 
enhanced “actual innocence” procedures is that defendants have to waive certain constitutional 
rights, including the right to object to illegally seized evidence,68 and the right to a jury trial.69 In 
turn, there would be greater pre-trial disclosure by the prosecution – but also by the defense.70 
Those who opt for these “innocence procedures” would be given increased opportunities to claim 
innocence post-trial, including the right to a review of conviction if there is significant new 
evidence, and to a re-trial if that new evidence leads to a substantial doubt about guilt.71  
Similar to the Risingers and Gross, Findley favors full disclosure of the prosecution’s file 
to the defense in advance of the trial.72 His most radical suggestion is that states establish an 
“Office of Public Advocacy” in which lawyers alternate between prosecution and defense, so 
that they become committed to the search for the truth.73 Unlike Bakken and Risinger, however, 
                                                          
60 P. G. Cassell, “Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations on Proposed 
New Innocence Procedures”,  New York Law School Law Review, LVI (2011-12), p. 1063, at p. 1069. 
61 Bakken, note 36 above, p. 549 and pp. 561-562.  
62 Ibid., pp. 562 and 575.  
63 Ibid., p. 574 (emphasis added). 
64 Ibid., pp. 563 and 569. 
65 S. R. Gross, “Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or 
Innocence”, New York Law School Law Review, LVI (2011/12), p. 1009, at p. 1023. 
66 Ibid., p. 1024. 
67 The Fifth Amendment provides, inter alia, that: “No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself.” 
68 Gross, note 65 above, p. 1023. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., pp. 1025-1026. 
71 Ibid., p. 1023. See also p. 1027. 
72 K. A. Findley, “Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the Truth”, New York Law School Law 
Review, LVI (2011/12), p. 911, at pp. 937-938. 
73 Ibid., p. 913. See also p. 935: “This structure would be designed to create a culture that mutes the polarizing 
forces of career adversaries.” 
  
Findley’s proposals would not require the “actually innocent” defendant to give up the right to 
lawyer/client confidentiality, nor forfeit the right to remain silent.74 
While the details of these “actual innocence” processes vary from one author to another, 
a key similarity is that each is attracted to aspects of continental European systems of criminal 
procedure. Thus Slobogin accepts that his proposals are “a hybrid between pure adversarialism 
and pure inquisitorialism, one that moves closer to the procedural regime that exists in a number 
of civil law countries”,75 while Bakken notes that under his scheme, those who opt for an 
“innocence” plea “are in essence pleading for an inquisitorial process”.76 Slobogin’s suggestion 
that the defendant give unsworn testimony at trial is somewhat similar to the position in some 
continental European systems, such as Germany and Switzerland, where a defendant can lie 
without penalty or other adverse consequences.77 Where it differs, however, is that Slobogin 
would make such testimony mandatory. As previously noted, Findley’s proposals would not 
require the “actually innocent” to give up the right to lawyer/client confidentiality, nor would 
complete pretrial disclosure of the defense case be compulsory, but this is because he believes 
that continental European systems “function quite well” without requiring waiver of such 
rights.78  
We can also see the inquisitorial influence in the Risingers’ proposals, particularly the 
suggestion that pre-trial procedures be overseen by a judicial officer,79 and in Gross’s similar 
suggestion that the judge become a more active investigator.80 This seems very like the role 
played by a French investigating judge/juge d’instruction. These scholars may, however, have an 
overly optimistic view of continental European systems of justice. Empirical studies suggest that 
judicial oversight in France, for example, is not necessarily a guarantee of greater truth-finding 
accuracy,81 and similar criticisms are made of the Dutch system.82 Furthermore, giving the trial 
judge primary responsibility for cross-examining the witnesses can only work effectively if the 
judge has had sight, prior to the trial, of the evidence the witnesses are likely to give.83 Thus a 
                                                          
74 Ibid., p. 937. 
75 Slobogin, note 35 above, p. 702. 
76 Bakken, note 36 above, p. 563. 
77 See R. S. Frase and T. Weigend, “German Criminal Justice as a Guide to American Law Reform: Similar 
Problems, Better Solutions?”, Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, XVIII (1995), p. 317, at 
p. 343; M. Killias, “Wrongful Convictions in Switzerland: The Experience of a Continental Law Country” in C.R. 
Huff and M. Killias (eds.) Wrongful Conviction: International Perspectives on Miscarriages of Justice (2008), pp. 
142–143. 
78 Findley, note 72 above, p. 937. 
79 Risinger and Risinger, note 19 above, pp. 882-883.  
80 Gross, note 65 above, pp. 1027-1028. 
81 It has been suggested that the French system “structurally and ideologically excludes the defence whilst providing 
no real guarantee that the accused will be adequately protected” (J. Hodgson, “The Police, the Prosecutor and the 
Juge D'instruction: Judicial Supervision in France, Theory and Practice”,  British Journal of Criminology, XLI 
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more pro-active judge requires a continental-type dossier, which in turn involves greater pre-trial 
disclosure of evidence from both prosecution and defense. 
Each of the scholars whose reforms are described above is convinced that the 
inquisitorial approach is better than the adversarial system at determining “the truth”, By 
contrast, some European scholars argue that while both types of system are “vulnerable to 
delivering wrong verdicts”,84 it is in fact the adversarial approach which is better at truth-
finding.85 It is of course impossible to determine whether one system is more adept at this than 
the other since we cannot know how many factually innocent people are convicted under either 
type of process, nor how many of the factually guilty are acquitted.  Rather than continuing this 
old and somewhat sterile debate we would do well to recognize, as Jackson suggests, that truth-
finding procedures “are rooted in particular epistemological conceptions of law”.86 
 
Pleading “Actual Innocence” in Practice 
 
The various reform proposals described above could easily be dismissed as of purely academic 
interest, divorced from the “real world” of the criminal process. However, it was reported in 
April 2016 that a prosecutor in St Clair County, Illinois is “trying a radical new experiment”, 
namely “admitting his office has charged innocent people with crimes and clearing their names 
before they spend a day in prison.”87 Lashonda Moreland is one of those who have benefitted 
from a new form of criminal process. She was arrested for shoplifting, evading police and trying 
to run down a police officer with a car. The officer purported to identify Moreland as the driver 
who had attempted to run him down. Moreland claimed that she had not visited the shop in 
question and that the car was not hers – it had been registered to her address by her cousin. She 
was remanded in custody and the case would ordinarily have gone to trial some months later, but 
her lawyer contacted the prosecutor and told him that Moreland was, in fact, innocent. This 
caused the prosecutor to offer Moreland a lie detector test. When she passed it, the prosecution 
conducted a review of all the evidence and the case against her was dropped.  
This novel process was part of the County’s “Actual Innocence Claim Policy and 
Protocol”, described as a “unique, pre-conviction intervention which attempts to prevent the 
‘actually innocent’ from going through a trial, taking a plea deal, or ending up in prison.”88 Just 
as several of our American scholars advocate, rather than pleading “not guilty” a defendant in 
Clair County may now plead “innocent.” Moreland’s case can be contrasted to that of Henry Earl 
Clark, who was charged with a drug offense in Texas. He spent six weeks in jail before being 
assigned a lawyer, then another seven weeks before his case was dismissed when it was realized 
that he had been the victim of mistaken identity.89 His case is far from exceptional.90  
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While we can begin to see the attractions of having special procedures and pleas for the 
“actually innocent”, such an approach is likely to be highly detrimental to those who maintain 
the traditional plea of “not guilty”. Returning to our discussion of the differences between 
“factual” and “legal” guilt, official recognition of the concept of “factual innocence” is likely to 
cause courts, lawyers and the media to pay far less attention to wrongful convictions involving 
people who may well be factually guilty, but whose conviction was obtained through violation of 
their rights.91 Defense lawyers should not offer, nor should they be expected to offer, a better 
standard of service to those who protest their innocence since their ethical duty is to represent all 
their clients to the best of their abilities. Further, special processes for the “actually innocent” 
may well cause jurors to form the view that those who instead opt to plead “not guilty” are in 
effect saying that they are “factually guilty”: that they did commit the crime, but should be 
acquitted due to some flawed aspect of the process such as the way in which the evidence was 
acquired. In all but the most egregious of flawed procedures, such as where a confession has 
been obtained by torture, it is likely that jurors would regard such an acquittal as being based on 
“a technicality”. Thus if jurors do currently take the presumption of innocence seriously, moving 
to a system which recognizes a plea of “actual innocence” would be likely to erode that 
presumption for those who plead “not guilty”.92 In short, special procedures for the “actually 
innocent” endanger the due process rights which should be afforded to all defendants – even 
those who are factually guilty. Rather than embrace the concept of “actual innocence”, reformers 
would be better advised to focus their efforts on changing other aspects of the criminal process. 
 
Comparing the Scottish and United States Systems of Criminal Procedure 
 
The Scottish and United States systems of criminal procedure share many fundamental features, 
such as the presumption of innocence, the standard of proof, the centrality of the trial, the role of 
the judge as a neutral referee, and party control of the evidence. Each has state systems of 
prosecution and employs jury trials in serious cases. Yet Scotland has not witnessed similar calls 
for the adoption of special “innocence” pleas or procedures. This part of the article compares 
aspects of the two systems in an attempt to determine whether Scotland has particular features 
which guard against wrongful conviction.  
 
 Police, Prosecution, and Judiciary 
 
In the United States there are thousands of local law-enforcement bodies.93 This is different from 
Scotland; although there are more than 100 reporting agencies which conduct criminal 
investigations of a specialized nature, such as the Health and Safety Executive and the Scottish 
Environment Protection Agency,94 the great majority of cases are dealt with by the police, and all 
resultant prosecutions are the responsibility of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service 
(COPFS), a national body. Scotland now has one police force, giving a high level of standardized 
                                                          
91  E. Hughes, “Innocence Unmodified”, North Carolina Law Review, LXXXIX (2010-11), p.1083, at p. 1087.  
92 See also H. Quirk, “Identifying Miscarriages of Justice: Why Innocence in the UK is Not the Answer”, Modern 
Law Review, LXX (2007), p. 759, at p. 771. 
93 M. Zalman and R. Grunewald, “Reinventing the Trial: The Innocence Revolution and Proposals to Modify the 
American Criminal Trial”, Texas A&M Law Review, III (2015), p. 189, at p. 247. 
94 See http://www.copfs.gov.uk/about-us/what-we-do 
  
practice. There has been a plethora of cases of prosecutorial misconduct in the US,95 but no such 
cases in Scotland. This may in part be due to the approach taken by Scottish prosecutors, who do 
not generally feel that they must defend a conviction at all cost, and occasionally will offer no 
opposition to an appeal.96 The Crown has accepted that a defendant may appeal against 
conviction on the basis of a miscarriage of justice even where the conviction had resulted from a 
plea of guilty.97 By contrast, some US prosecutors have been accused of defending convictions 
even in cases where there has demonstrably been an error.98  
It is difficult to know what accounts for this difference in approach, but one factor may 
be that the office of US prosecutor is often an elected one, and those facing re-election may feel 
the need to have a high conviction rate as a way of demonstrating to voters that they are “tough 
on crime”.99 No Scottish prosecutor is elected. Indeed, it is noteworthy that, historically, the 
position of the most senior prosecutor, the Lord Advocate, was often filled by someone with 
expertise in an area other than criminal law. Although the previous two Lord Advocates came 
from within the ranks of the COPFS, the appointment of the current incumbent, in June 2016, 
reverts to the previous practice: James Wolffe QC was formerly Dean of the Faculty of 
Advocates and is more of a commercial or public law expert than a criminal lawyer.100 
Prosecutions in the High Court of Justiciary, Scotland’s highest criminal trials court, are 
conducted by advocates depute (ADs). Experienced members of the COPFS may be appointed to 
these posts but it is more common for ADs to come from the Faculty of Advocates, and to be 
people who do not specialize in criminal law. This system helps to ensure that senior prosecutors 
maintain a level of independence from the COPFS, and since they will generally not be “career 
prosecutors” they may be less likely to become case-hardened. ADs who aspire to judicial 
appointment may wish to avoid acquiring a reputation for being more interested in “counting 
scalps” than in justice. This too may moderate any tendency to overzealousness.  
As previously noted, Findley proposes that US states establish an Office of Public 
Advocacy to supervise police investigations. In Germany, the prosecutor is referred to as “Herrin 
des Ermittlungsverfahrens” or “Master of the Investigation”, and can give instructions to the 
police.101 Dutch police are likewise “subordinate to the public prosecutor”.102 Brants claims that 
while prosecutors in adversarial systems can refuse to prosecute a case where the evidence is 
weak or tainted with illegality, they have no control of the pre-trial investigation, and “cannot tell 
the police what to do.”103 This may be so in some adversarial systems, but it is not correct so far 
as Scotland is concerned; legislation provides that in all cases the police must follow the 
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prosecutor’s instructions.104 This dominant position of the Crown was well described in the case 
of Boyle v HM Advocate: 105 it is for the Lord Advocate  
to decide when and against whom to launch prosecution and upon what charges.  It is for 
him to decide in which Court they shall be prosecuted.  It is for him to decide what pleas 
of guilt he will accept and it is for him to decide when to withdraw or abandon 
proceedings. Not only so, even when a verdict of guilt has been returned and recorded it 
still lies with the Lord Advocate whether to move the Court to pronounce sentence, and 
without that motion no sentence can be pronounced or imposed.  In the exercise of these 
formidable responsibilities the Lord Advocate has at his disposal the fullest available 
machinery of inquiry and investigation.106  
There is also less judicial independence in the US, where the position of state court judge 
is an elected one. One commentator suggests that  
enforcing the law may cost [judges] their jobs. An elected judge who upholds a 
constitutional right of a person accused of child molestation, murder, or some other crime 
may be signing his or her own political death warrant.107  
By contrast, no Scottish judges are elected; they have tenure until they retire.  Members of the 
High Court of Justiciary can be removed from office only by the Queen, acting on the 
recommendation of the First Minister of the Scottish Parliament, following a resolution to that 
effect from the Parliament.108 This must be preceded by a finding by an independent tribunal that 
the judge is unfit to hold office by reason of “inability, neglect of duty or misbehaviour.”109  
 
 Defense Lawyers 
 
In 1963 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Gideon v Wainwright110 that the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution requires states to provide a lawyer for any defendant 
who faces prosecution for a serious crime and cannot afford to pay for legal advice. Some states 
interpreted the reference to serious cases to mean felonies, as opposed to misdemeanors,111 but 
the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that no one could be sentenced to a period of 
imprisonment unless they have received the benefit of legal assistance at trial, or have waived the 
right.112 Gideon did not give any guidance as to how states should determine whether or not a 
defendant was too poor to afford a lawyer, and in practice the threshold is often set at a very low 
                                                          
104 Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012, s 17(3). See also the COPFS Book of Regulations, para 2.1.3, 
available at: http://www.crownoffice.gov.uk/images/Documents/Prosecution 
Policy_Guidance/Book_of_Regulations/Book%20of%20Regulations%20-%20Chapter%202%20-
%20Investigation%20of%20Serious%20Crime.PDF 
105 1976 JC 32. 
106 Ibid., 37, per Lord Cameron. See also Jude, Hodgson and Birnie v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 55, para. [17]. 
107 S. B. Bright, “Is Fairness Irrelevant: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas Corpus Review and Limits on the 
Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights”, Washington & Lee Law Review, LIV (1997), p. 1, at p. 10. 
108 Scotland Act 1989, s 95(10). 
109 For the composition of these tribunals see the Judiciary and Courts (Scotland) Act 2008, s 35(1) (for High Court 
judges) and the Courts Reform (Scotland) Act 2014, s 21(1) (for sheriffs). Justices of the Peace (the judges in the 
lowest criminal courts in Scotland) are subject to similar processes for dismissal by the Criminal Proceedings etc. 
Reform (Scotland) Act 2007, s 71. 
110 372 US 335 (1963). 
111 A misdemeanour is a crime with a maximum penalty of one year’s imprisonment; a felony generally attracts a 
greater maximum penalty. 
112 Argersinger v Hamlin 407 US 25 (1972). 
  
level indeed, so that only the very poorest are eligible for a state-funded lawyer.113 The 
Innocence Movement has reignited the debate on adequate legal representation,114 with the lack 
of financial assistance to pay for counsel being described as “the most serious challenge to 
justice” facing the US.115 It seems that more than 50 years after Gideon, the right to a lawyer 
remains the preserve of those who can afford it.116  
In contrast, the Scottish Legal Aid Board is empowered by legislation to provide 
assistance to any person “if the Board is satisfied after consideration of the person's financial 
circumstances that the expenses of the case cannot be met without undue hardship to the person 
or the person’s dependants.”117 Those of low income or who are in receipt of state benefits, and 
with low levels of disposable capital, are given free legal assistance, while others contribute to 
their defense cost proportionately to their financial situation. There is also a state-funded Public 
Defence Solicitors’ Office, based in seven of the Scottish cities.  
In Strickland v Washington 118 the US Supreme Court held that the right to legal 
assistance requires a lawyer who is competent and effective. In practice, however, the courts 
have held that there has been no breach of this right even where defense counsel fell asleep or 
was drunk during the trial; was openly racist while representing a black defendant; or represented 
a defendant in a capital murder trial despite having no experience of criminal practice.119 Again, 
this is in contrast to the Scottish approach; as Lord Hope stated in the leading case on defective 
legal representation,  
an essential principle for any system of criminal justice is the [defendant’s] right to a fair 
trial. That right involves the right … to have his defence presented to the court. … If the 
system breaks down to such an extent that the defence is not presented, it would be a 
denial of justice for the court not to intervene in order to set aside the conviction and 
allow a new trial.120  
There have been few cases in which legal representation has fallen below this threshold.  
 
 Pre-trial Procedural Safeguards 
 
As we have seen, some scholars advocate a greater pre-trial role for the American trial judge, 
with a view to improving the lot of the “actually innocent” defendant.  Others draw attention to 
the French system in which the defendant has a right to request that the investigating magistrate 
carry out further investigations into the crime, and suggest that in the US the defense ought to be 
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permitted to request the prosecutor to conduct further investigations.121 In Scotland, potential 
pre-trial safeguards include the defense right to request an identification parade,122 and to 
interview potential witnesses on oath.123 A defense lawyer who believes her client to be “actually 
innocent” could approach the prosecutor in advance of the trial. Any potentially exculpatory 
evidence would be checked and this may lead to charges being dropped. This is surely what 
ought to have happened in the American case of Lashonda Moreland, described above. It seems 
that at least some of wrongful convictions in the US may be attributed to police and prosecutors 
failing to do their jobs properly.  
 
 Interviewing Witnesses 
 
There is no extensive pre-trial preparation of witness testimony in Scotland, unlike in the US, 
where “witness prepping” is considered an ethically acceptable practice.124 Thus an American 
lawyer in preparing a witness  
typically does at least some of the following things: 
 discusses the witness’s perception, recollection, and possible testimony about the 
events in question; 
 reviews documents and other tangible items to refresh the witness’s memory or to 
point out conflicts and inconsistencies with the witness’s story; 
 reveals other tangible or testimonial evidence to the witness to find out how it affects 
the witness’s story;  
 explains how the law applies to the events in question; 
 reviews the factual context into which the witness’s testimony will fit; 
 discusses the role of the witness and effective courtroom demeanor; 
 discusses probable lines of cross examination that the witness should be prepared to 
meet; 
 rehearses the witness’s testimony, by role playing or other means.125 
In relation to the first of these, a Scottish prosecutor may note the witness’s perceptions and 
recollections, but may not “discuss” these with the witness. None of the other actions is 
permitted.  There is a subtle but nonetheless important distinction between acceptable witness 
preparation and improper coaching. Coaching – whether deliberate or inadvertent – can cause 
witnesses to alter their testimony. It too has become a source of wrongful convictions.126 
 
 Bail 
 
Under the US bail system, courts generally require defendants to provide a sum of money as a 
surety that they will attend their trial as a condition of being released from custody in the interim. 
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The Eighth Amendment provides that: “Excessive bail shall not be required”,127 but this has not 
prevented courts from setting bail at levels which are unaffordable by many, and it has been 
estimated that 450,000 people are incarcerated in the US each day due to inability to raise bail,128 
with half of jail inmates awaiting trial.129 In some states, courts issue a bail payment schedule on 
an annual basis, and even for minor offenses a fixed sum of money must be paid before liberty is 
granted.130 Bail is a competent disposal for all crimes in Scotland, but may be subject to 
conditions designed to ensure that defendants attend trial and will not interfere with witnesses.131 
The court or the Lord Advocate can impose as one of the conditions that the defendant deposits a 
sum of money with the court, but only if such a condition “is appropriate to the special 
circumstances of the case”.132 In practice, this is very rarely required. 
Incarceration pre-trial makes it much harder for a defendant to challenge the prosecution 
case or establish a defense.133 Psychologically, it is more likely that defendants who are on 
remand prior to trial will succumb to the pressures to plead guilty.134 This is particularly so 
where the remand conditions are much less favorable than those following conviction. In 
Scotland, untried prisoners are kept separate from convicted ones, have greater access to their 
lawyers, have increased visiting rights for family members, and are able to wear their own 
clothes. It is arguable that this is in keeping with the presumption of innocence, if we interpret 
that presumption to mean that an untried person should be treated the same as any other citizen 
to the extent that this is possible. 
 
 Pre-Trial Disclosure  
 
We have seen that some of those who champion special procedures for those who claim “actual 
innocence” would compel defendants who wish to take advantage of these procedures to play a 
more active role in the process, including a requirement to be forthcoming about potential 
defenses. Pre-trial disclosure in US federal courts is governed by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, and by the Jencks Act (2012).135 Rule 16 requires the prosecution to 
produce “books, papers, documents, data, photographs [and] tangible objects … within the 
government’s possession, custody and control” which are “material to preparing the defense”, or 
which the prosecution intends to use as evidence at trial.136 Crucially, however, the Jencks Act 
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exempts statements from prosecution witnesses from this disclosure regime until they have 
actually been called to testify.137 This is not pre-trial disclosure; rather it is “at trial” disclosure, 
and is therefore of limited value in assisting defense preparation. Pre-trial prosecution disclosure 
for state crimes varies greatly from one state to another.138 In Brady v Maryland 139 the Supreme 
Court determined that it is a breach of Constitutional rights for the prosecution to fail to inform 
the defense about any exculpatory evidence of which the state is aware. However, the Brady 
process has been criticized for allowing the prosecution to determine whether something is 
“exculpatory” and “material”.140 In many states there is no formal requirement for the 
prosecution to disclose even its list of witnesses to the defense,141 far less is the defense entitled 
to interview these witnesses pre-trial.142 When such interviews are permitted, witnesses are 
generally interviewed by defense counsel in the presence of their client. If this were changed, 
perhaps more states might be willing to permit greater access to prosecution witnesses, pre-trial. 
Scotland’s pre-trial disclosure processes requires the prosecution to inform the defense of 
the evidence it intends to lead at trial, as well as any information which would materially weaken 
or undermine that evidence or materially strengthen the defense case.143 This duty is “a 
continuing one – it persists in perpetuity.”144 It is now routine for the defense to be given the 
police statements taken from all witnesses on the Crown witness lists, as well as information 
concerning any previous convictions and pending prosecutions which these witnesses may 
have.145 The Crown Office Disclosure Manual advises:  
When assessing the materiality of a piece of information, a generous approach should be 
adopted and where there is a doubt about the materiality of a piece of information, then 
the Crown must err on the side of disclosure.146  
The defense also has a separate and long-standing statutory right to have access pre-trial to the 
Crown “productions”, that is, the documents and physical evidence which the prosecution 
intends to introduce during the trial.147  
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 Plea-Bargaining and Sentence-Bargaining  
 
In some states of the United States, DNA evidence which proves innocence may not be presented 
on appeal if the defendant pled guilty, even though the plea bargaining process offers such high 
sentence discounts for a guilty plea that it is likely that many innocent persons plead guilty to 
avoid lengthy period of imprisonment.148 While plea bargaining, or “charge bargaining” is a 
common occurrence in Scottish courts, and there is a sentence discount for those who plead 
guilty at an early stage,149 there are not the extreme disparities which can be found in the US. For 
example, in one American case the prosecution advised the defendant that if he agreed to plead 
guilty to the crime of uttering, he would receive a sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment. If, 
however, he maintained his plea of not guilty he would be prosecuted instead under a different 
statute, with a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The defendant refused to plead guilty to 
the lesser charge, was convicted of the more serious one, and was indeed given a life sentence. 
The Supreme Court was unperturbed by this, holding that it was a legitimate exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.150  
In Scotland and many US states, increased penalties may be imposed if the prosecution 
establishes that the defendant was motivated by certain forms of hatred towards the victim.151 
However, the option of prosecuting a more serious crime, with a higher maximum penalty – or 
even a higher mandatory penalty – has been strengthened for US prosecutors by “sentence 
enhancement” legislation. Defined as “a fact or set of circumstances that, once proved, serves to 
increase a defendant’s punishment”,152 sentence enhancements are designed to induce a guilty 
plea to the non-enhanced charge which is offered as an alternative. For example, an assault 
which could be depicted as being motivated “for the benefit of a gang” has a higher maximum 
sentence than an assault committed without such a motive, and the disparity in the two sentences 
could very well induce an innocent defendant to plead guilty to the latter to avoid a conviction 
for the former.153 US defendants may plead nolo contendere, which means that they accept the 
sentence being imposed by the court but refuse to admit guilt. Judges also have discretion to 
accept a so-called Alford plea154 which allows a defendant to maintain innocence but nonetheless 
plead guilty, to avoid the greater penalty which would be imposed on conviction after trial. 155 
Alford pleas are made by 3 per cent of federal defendants and more than 6 per cent of state 
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defendants.156 Neither of these pleas is permitted in Scotland; if a defendant offered to plead 
guilty while protesting innocence, the prosecution would proceed to trial.  
 
 Juries, Verdicts, Opening Speeches and Closing Arguments 
 
The voir-dire process in the United States allows lawyers on both sides to attempt to shape the 
jury in a way which is more likely to favor their case. In Scotland, no such questioning of jurors 
is permitted,157 the appeal court going so far as to say: 
It is not a sufficient cause for a juror to be excused that he is of a particular race, religion, 
or political belief or occupation, or indeed that the juror might or might not feel prejudice 
one way or the other towards the crime itself or to the background against which the 
crime has been committed.158  
One cannot imagine a similar sentiment being expressed by an American court: any hint that a 
juror might harbor such prejudice would surely be subject to challenge by the parties.  
In relation to jury size and verdicts, Scotland is unusual in having a jury of 15, in 
permitting conviction on a bare majority, and in having a “not proven” verdict as well as the 
more usual options of “guilty” and “not guilty”.159 There are no opening speeches in a Scottish 
trial, unlike the position in the US. At the close of the evidence, and before the judge’s 
summation, the Scottish prosecutor makes a closing address to the jury, then the defense lawyer 
does likewise. This is in contrast to the position in the majority of US states, in which the 
prosecution makes its final arguments after the defense has done so. Described as a “fundamental 
tenet of American jurisprudence”,160 it is claimed that this ordering of closing arguments “favors 
traditional notions of fairness”.161 By contrast, to a Scottish-trained lawyer, fairness requires that 
the defense gets to speak last. It is difficult to know what impact jury size, majority verdicts, and 
order of speeches have on the defendant’s chances of acquittal, far less whether they offer any 
sort of a safeguard against wrongful conviction.162 Scottish lawyers do, however, cherish their 
right to have the “last word” – a right which is enshrined in statute.163  
 
 Corroboration 
 
Scotland retains a corroboration requirement: the essential elements of a crime, namely the fact 
that a crime has been committed and that the defendant is the person who committed it, must be 
established by the prosecution by means of two independent sources of evidence. According to 
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the Risingers, “multiple identifying witnesses are no good guarantee of accuracy, so counting 
multiple identifications as mutually corroborating in any strong sense is a tragically flawed 
perception.”164 Nevertheless, the chances of two witnesses misidentifying the defendant as the 
perpetrator are less than one witness doing so, and it may be argued that in general corroboration 
provides a safeguard against wrongful conviction. It is, however, a safeguard which is under 
attack in Scotland, with a judge-led review recommending that the corroboration requirement be 
abolished.165 This suggestion provoked such hostility among the legal profession that the 
provision in the draft legislation which would have effected this change was subsequently 
dropped, and the then Justice Secretary announced that the matter required further consideration. 
In the US, the uncovering of wrongful convictions has led to calls for a corroboration 
requirement for some particularly problematic forms of evidence,166 or even that no conviction 
should be based on only one piece of evidence.167 At a time when some American prosecutors 
are considering dropping cases which are dependent on the testimony of a single eyewitness,168 it 
would be unfortunate if Scotland were to abolish this important safeguard. 
 
 Expert Witnesses  
 
There have been cases involving perjured expert testimony and falsified laboratory reports in the 
United States, and it has been suggested that there is clear bias on the part of some experts in 
favor of the prosecution.169 Legal Aid in Scotland generally covers the expense involved in 
obtaining an expert opinion. Forensic experts testify for whichever side approaches them first, 
but their primary obligation “is to assist the court and remain independent of the parties”.170 Less 
happily, the Scottish courts are reluctant to allow the defense to call its own experts for certain 
types of evidence. In Gage v HM Advocate171 the defense sought to introduce evidence from a 
psychologist to explain to the jury that witnessing a serious and violent crime would tend to 
decrease the accuracy of any identification of the perpetrator. It also wanted the expert to 
describe the distorting effect which information acquired by a witness after an incident can have 
on the memory of that incident. The appeal court refused to admit such evidence, listing several 
objections, including that the credibility and reliability of identification evidence is a jury 
issue,172 and that trial judges provide jurors with detailed warnings about the potential 
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unreliability of such evidence.173 The court also noted that the defense was permitted to highlight 
this potential unreliability during cross-examination, and could lead evidence of specific factors 
which might affect reliability.174  
 In 2009 the US Supreme Court held that expert witnesses should be permitted to educate 
jurors about the very matters the defense wanted its expert to address in Gage, namely the 
psychological literature on the impact of stress on identifications, and the distorting effects of 
post-event information.175 The Court also noted that expert evidence could educate jurors about 
cross-racial identifications, and the weak correlation between witness confidence at trial and 
accuracy of identification.176 Risinger recommends that expert evidence which the defense wish 
to lead on factors such as the weaknesses of eyewitness identifications, false confessions, etc. 
should no longer be ruled inadmissible by US courts on the basis that this invades the province 
of the jury.177 Scottish law would benefit from taking a similar approach. 
 
 Previous Convictions 
Scottish defendants who attack the honesty of prosecution witnesses, give evidence of their own 
“good character”, or testify against co-defendants, may find that their own previous convictions 
are revealed to the judge or jury. This is generally at the discretion of the prosecutor,178 and 
becomes mandatory only if the witness whose reputation the defendant is attacking is the 
complainer (i.e. the alleged victim) in a sexual offense case.179 Apart from these quite narrow 
exceptions, legislation prevents previous convictions from being revealed until there is either a 
guilty plea or guilty verdict.180 By contrast, in many US states, defendants who testify 
automatically expose themselves to their criminal records being revealed.181 There is evidence 
that in “close” cases – defined as those in which there is some, but insufficient, evidence of guilt 
– such knowledge promotes juries to convict.182 This may well lead to conviction of the “actually 
innocent”. It also seems that many of those subsequently exonerated by DNA analysis chose not 
to testify at trial due to a fear of having their previous convictions exposed.183 Innocent 
defendants ought not to have to choose between explaining the truth, while hoping that the 
revealing of past convictions does not deflect jurors from deciding the cases before them on the 
facts, rather than on defendants’ past misdeeds, or opting not to testify, while hoping that silence 
is not misconstrued as guilt. 
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 Criminal Case Review Commissions 
 
There seem to be few mechanisms in the US by which those who have exhausted all avenues of 
appeal at state level may claim that they have been wrongly convicted and are factually innocent. 
Defendants must employ the habeas corpus provisions in federal courts, contending that their 
continued imprisonment violates the Constitution.184 In Herrera v Collins185 the Supreme Court 
stated, albeit obiter, that if a convicted person were able to make a really persuasive case of 
factual innocent, it would be unconstitutional for that person to then be executed. However, the 
Court held that a claim of actual innocence must be coupled with an independent Constitutional 
violation.186  
The Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) was established in 1999.187 
The enabling legislation provides that the Commission may refer a case to the Scottish appeal 
court if it believes that a miscarriage of justice may have occurred and that it is in the interests of 
justice that a reference should be made.188 It seems that the SCCRC debated whether it should 
refer a (hypothetical) case to the court if it believed that there had been a miscarriage of justice, 
but also believed that the applicant was “factually guilty”.189  It concluded that it would not be 
“in the interests of justice” to refer a case where, despite evidence that there may have been a 
miscarriage of justice, “there is compelling evidence of the guilt of the applicant.”190 This 
approach is based on the view that the SCCRC’s primary function is to prevent factually 
innocent people from being punished for offenses they had not committed.191 According to a 
former Commissioner, however: 
In practice, I cannot remember the Commission referring a case where I was absolutely 
certain that the applicant was factually innocent; quite simply, it was never possible to be 
sure about precisely what had happened. As regards some referrals, I thought it possible 
that the applicant was innocent but, as regards others, I had severe doubts as to their 
innocence but was not sure enough of their guilt to argue against a referral. In all such 
cases, however, I was convinced there had been a “miscarriage of justice” in legal 
terms.192 
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A study of the Commission’s first 10 years found that it had received 939 applications193 
and referred 75 of these to the appeal court.194 This gives a referral rate of eight per cent, 195 
which compares favorably with the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) for England, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, whose referral rate is less than four per cent.196 Of the 75 Scottish 
cases, 42 related to conviction, rather than sentencing,197 30 of which had been determined by the 
date of the study. 18 cases had resulted in a quashing of the convictions (a 60 per cent success 
rate.198) It may be argued that state funded organizations such as the SCCRC or CCRC offer a 
better solution to investigating miscarriages of justice than ad hoc innocent projects.199 
    
Conclusions 
 
It should not be thought that Scotland has all the solutions to the “innocence problem” in the 
United States, far less that its criminal procedure is entirely satisfactory. As previously noted, the 
proposal to abolish the corroboration requirement is a particular cause for concern. Nevertheless, 
this article has highlighted aspects of Scottish criminal procedure which may protect the 
“actually innocent” from wrongful conviction, or at least make such convictions less likely. As 
we have seen, some of the suggested reforms in the United States, such as pre-trial disclosure of 
prosecution evidence to the defense, already feature in the Scottish process. Admittedly, there 
has been a degree of quid pro quo here, with the defense now required to disclose its case pre-
trial, but Scottish defendants retain the right to silence, both during police questioning and at 
trial, and lawyer/client confidentiality is maintained, thus we have not witnessed the diminution 
of defense rights being proposed by some American legal scholars. Scotland does not have an 
“Office of Public Advocacy” with lawyers alternating between prosecution and defense, as 
proposed by Findley, but the practice of drawing senior prosecutors mainly from the defense Bar 
and the “non-criminal” Bar is an important safeguard against prosecutorial tunnel-vision. The 
Legal Aid system in Scotland provides free legal advice at the police station, during bail 
proceedings, and at trial for the great majority of defendants. Coupled with the fact that money 
bail is extremely rare, this makes it less likely that factually innocent people will plead guilty to 
avoid languishing in jail for long periods, pre-trial.  
Scotland is not facing an “innocence crisis” akin to that being experienced in the United 
States. It is therefore unlikely that any of the novel innocence procedures being proposed – and 
indeed utilized – in America will be adopted in Scotland. Those looking to reform criminal 
procedures in the United States may be better advised to consider borrowing features found in 
other adversarial systems such as Scotland, rather than opting for a more inquisitorial approach 
or devising new processes to accommodate pleas of “actual innocence”.  
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